Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

At the beginning of his book, Principles of Christian Theology, John Macquarrie says that theology ‘implicitly claims to have its place in the total intellectual endeavour of mankind’. The question I want to discuss is this: in what terms, if any, can that claim be justified?

It is sometimes suggested that the logic of religious language differs from other kinds of language. Or it is said that each ‘language-game’ has its own ‘logic’ and that, whatever usual language-games are played in the context of religion, there is something that could be called the ‘religious language-game’ which does not correspond to any other and, therefore, has its own peculiar logic. In either case, religious people are urged to make clear what this logic is, so that their utterances (...) may be understood and evaluated. (shrink)

I want to put forward a certain view of the logical foundation of religious belief. It is, in a sentence, the view that religious belief is constituted by the concept of god. This view will be discussed under three headings. First, I shall explain as clearly as I can what I mean by it. Secondly, I shall indicate what seem to me to be interesting parallels, both with regard to universes of discourse in general and to religious belief in particular, (...) between my idea of a constitutive concept and Wittgenstein's ideas of a fundamental proposition and a religious ‘picture’. Thirdly, I shall try to substantiate the view I take of the logical foundation of religious belief by rebutting three conceivable objections to it: namely, that it rests on an illegitimate craving for generality, that it is at variance with common usage, and that it consigns religious belief to an intellectual ghetto. (shrink)

What connexion is there between factual statements concerning God or man and moral judgments? That is the question which occasions this paper. Not long ago moral philosophers were wont to say that there is a logical gap between the two sorts of utterance to which I have just referred: that nothing follows in terms of moral value from a statement of fact, no ‘ought’ from any ‘is’. They recognised only one restriction on what may be said in terms of ‘ought’ (...) by what has been said in terms of ‘is’, namely that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. It is manifest nonsense to say that anyone ought to do what he cannot do. But, this apart, they thought it possible without contradiction or anomaly to hold any conceivable factual belief and at the same time subscribe to any conceivable moral judgment. They would have held that it makes perfectly good sense to say, for example, ‘This is God’s will but it ought not to be done’ or ‘Men are not pigs but a good man will live like a pig’. Bizarre such judgments may be, they would have said, but nonsensical they are not. They conceived it to be their main business, as moral philosophers, to erect warning notices along the edge of the is-ought gap so that contemporary moralists would not fall headlong into it as so many of their predecessors, in less enlightened ages, had done. (shrink)

W. D. Hart; Discussions: For Anil Gupta, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 90, Issue 1, 1 June 1990, Pages 161–166, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristo.

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

W D Hudson; Educating, Socialising and Indoctrination: a reply to Tasos Kazepides, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 16, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 16.

vol. I. Logic: Categoriae. De interpretatione. Analytica priora. Analytica posteriora.--vol. II. Natural philosophy: Physica. De caelo. De generatione et corruptione.--vol. III. Psychology: De anima. Parva Naturalia.--vol. IV. Metaphysics: Metaphysica.--vol. V. Ethics: Ethica Nicomachea.--vol. VI. Politics and poetics: Politica. De poetica.

Forword: This study is not intended as a work of research into any existing body of philosopny. It is, rather, an independent inquiry into the origins and the objective of philosophical activity. In this it assumes the somewhat enigmatic r8le of a philosophy of philosophy.

There is a problem in §23 of Against Andokides, the sixth speech of the Corpus Lysiacum. The passage in question runs: ⋯κ δ᾽ οὖν το⋯του το⋯ τιμ⋯ματος ⋯δ⋯δετο ⋯γγὺς ⋯νιαυτ⋯ν … ‘And as a result of the proposed penalty he was imprisoned for nearly a year …’. The speaker's context is as follows: he is castigating Andokides in connection with his trial in 400/399 for impiety and describing his lawless life since his part in the great scandals of 415, the (...) mutilation of the Herms and the profanation of the Mysteries. The problem in the text concerns the words ⋯νιαυτ⋯ν ‘for nearly a year’, as the statement contradicts what we learn about Andokides' imprisonment in 415 from his own defence speech and above all from Thucydides. (shrink)

This is the third of five chapters on good, and inquires into what kinds of things are intrinsically good. The first thing claimed as intrinsically good is virtuous disposition and action; the second is pleasure in itself. These two approaches are briefly analysed, with the goodness or badness of pleasure given particular attention. Ross concludes that four things can be seen to be intrinsically good—virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge. He is unable to discover anything (...) that is intrinsically good that is not either one or a combination of these. (shrink)

Agricultural and rural development programs can only succeed if they are based on effective participation and support of actors from the policymaking stage through all levels, including field personnel and primary producers. But these actors must possess the knowledge, attitude, and skills necessary to execute their tasks. For this reason, agricultural education and training has an integral part to play in any agricultural and rural development effort. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has made significant contributions (...) to the development of agricultural education in its member countries. FAO's contributions have focused on institution building, group training, and fellowship/study tours. This paper reviews some of the lessons learned through FAO involvement in these areas and recommends directions for improvement. These recommendations include the following:Higher agricultural education institutions should become more involved in rural development by participating in appropriate activities leading to the formulation of national development policies.These institutions should develop education programs and curricula responding to the need of development by providing the knowledge and skills required to meet the needs of the people concerned and to solve their technical and socio-economic problems.More emphasis should be placed on improving the quality of teaching and on practical training.The same institutions should undertake to play a leading role in the agricultural and training systems at the national level.Research should be an integral part of higher educational institution programs and the research themes should include interests of small and poor agricultural producers and measurement of research impacts.Regional and inter-regional collaboration among higher agricultural education institutions should be encouraged. (shrink)

In The Retreat to Commitment , Professor W. W. Bartley III argues for a certain theory of rationality and contends that by this criterion it is not possible for a christian theist to be rational. His theory of rationality has already aroused considerable criticism, but his application of it to religious belief in particular, has not hitherto been widely considered.